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“Following the security debacle in Butler, the former director of USSS made the right decision to resign,” Johnson told RCP. “I see no reason for her security clearance to be reinstated.”
When pressed about Johnson’s comments, the Secret Service released a vague statement, with Director Curran saying that “not all former directors” are automatically entitled to maintain their clearances. The move strongly suggests the agency acknowledges deep concerns about Cheatle’s judgment and handling of threats.
These developments come in the wake of a damning Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, which exposed catastrophic breakdowns in communication, leadership, and decision-making at the agency under Cheatle’s tenure.
As reported last month, the GAO revealed that the Secret Service failed to notify Trump’s protective detail about an existing threat prior to the attempted assassination at a July 13 rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. The agency reportedly had intelligence about a potential plot ten days before the rally—but inexplicably chose not to share that information with the advance team on the ground.
Although the threat wasn’t tied specifically to the shooter, Thomas Crooks, or the Butler event, the GAO concluded that the agency’s outdated and compartmentalized communication protocols effectively left agents flying blind.
“Prior to the July 13 rally, senior-level Secret Service officials became aware of a threat to then-former President Trump… Secret Service and local law enforcement personnel central to developing site security plans for the rally were unaware of the threat,” the report stated.
The reason? The agency’s rigid, siloed structure prevented classified information from being properly disseminated—even when national security was at stake. The report emphasized that internal changes are urgently needed to ensure threat data is proactively shared with those responsible for operational planning.
The failures didn’t end there.
Fox News noted that the GAO identified multiple other red flags:
- A rookie agent with no experience securing large outdoor events was in charge of identifying vulnerabilities at the Butler venue.
- Trump’s staff had requested not to use farm equipment for visual coverage near a building so press photos wouldn’t be blocked. The advance team—unaware of the active threat—complied, unintentionally giving the gunman a clear shot.
- A Trump campaign request for enhanced aerial surveillance technology was denied by the Secret Service. Officials claimed the equipment was already allocated for the RNC and DNC events. It wasn’t until last-minute intervention from senior officials aware of the threat that sniper coverage was approved—coverage that ultimately stopped the shooter.
The GAO made it clear: had that last-minute decision not been made, the outcome could have been far more tragic.
The agency’s risk assessment process, the report found, is completely out of step with the realities of today’s threats. The current system does not take all known risks into account, and decisions are made in a patchwork, reactive manner rather than through structured policy.
In response to the report, Kimberly Cheatle attempted to deflect blame by describing the situation as a “perfect storm of events.” She also denied misleading Congress in her earlier testimony regarding the Secret Service’s preparation and actions.
But many in Washington—and across the country—aren’t buying it.
With Cheatle’s security clearance now officially denied and confidence in the Secret Service shaken to its core, Americans are left asking: how did our nation’s top protective agency fall this far?
One thing is clear—the fallout from the failed protection of President Trump continues to expose how deep the dysfunction ran under Cheatle’s watch. And now, even her access to the nation’s secrets has been deemed too risky.
