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Middle East analyst Lisa Daftari described Tehran’s reaction in stark terms, arguing that the geopolitical implications go beyond logistics.
“Iran’s regime is deeply threatened by what Somaliland represents in an emerging pro-Western, potentially pro-Israel foothold overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb, that could blunt Tehran’s leverage via the Houthis over Red Sea shipping and Israel.”
She further emphasized the intensity of the response already emerging from Iran-backed groups, stating, “that’s why Iran-backed Houthis are already explicitly threatening to strike any Israeli or Western military presence in Somaliland and warning they could move to choke the Bab el-Mandeb if the conflict with the U.S. and Israel escalates.”
The Trump administration, for its part, has pointed to recent operations against Iranian proxy forces as evidence of shifting momentum in the region. Officials argue that pressure campaigns targeting these groups are beginning to show measurable effects.
“The United States Military achieved all of the goals laid out for Operation Epic Fury – including weakening Iran’s proxies. Now, Iran is being strangled economically – giving President Trump all the cards as negotiations continue,” said Anna Kelly, special assistant to the President and White House principal deputy press secretary, when asked about potential long-term basing discussions involving Somaliland.
Experts tracking the region also note that Somaliland’s diplomatic outreach—particularly toward Israel—has added another layer of friction with Tehran.
Edmund Fitton-Brown, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former British ambassador to Yemen, pointed to the geopolitical signaling behind these developments.
Fitton-Brown explained that Iran’s opposition is rooted not only in regional rivalry but also in Somaliland’s emerging diplomatic relationships. He said Iran “opposes any recognition of it (Somaliland) primarily because Israel is the first state to recognize it, and Iran will oppose anything that Israel does. Iran is also viscerally opposed to the U.S. and UAE, both of which have pragmatic engagement with Somaliland, short of recognition. Somaliland is a potential base for anti-Houthi enforcement, i.e. a threat to the Iranian Axis of Resistance.”
The United States already maintains a significant military footprint in nearby Djibouti, home to Camp Lemonnier, its primary base in Africa. However, analysts suggest that the strategic landscape there is shifting due to growing Chinese influence.
“There is a sense that Djibouti is not a reliable ally for the U.S. So Somaliland’s time has probably come,” Fitton-Brown added, referencing Beijing’s expanding military and commercial presence in the region.
Somaliland’s leadership is now openly pressing its case. Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Adam emphasized the territory’s willingness to support U.S. operations in the Red Sea corridor.
“At a time when the Strait of Hormuz is under pressure and threats to the Red Sea are escalating, Somaliland has reiterated its longstanding offer to provide the United States with access along our coast. We have been clear about this in times of peace, and we are equally clear today.”
He also highlighted the operational advantages Somaliland believes it can provide to U.S. forces. “U.S. destroyers that expend their missile batteries in the Red Sea require (currently) up to two weeks of travel to be resupplied. Somaliland is ready to play a practical role in helping the U.S. to secure global trade routes,” he said.
In addition, Somaliland officials have reportedly discussed the possibility of storing munitions, including Tomahawk missiles, as part of broader cooperation efforts, describing it as a “unique way to advance security interests.”
Despite growing interest from some policymakers and defense analysts, U.S. policy continues to formally recognize Somaliland as part of Somalia, which it broke away from more than three decades ago. That creates a diplomatic constraint even as security cooperation quietly expands.
Retired Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Ekman, a former AFRICOM planner, described the dilemma facing Washington.
He noted that “a policy dilemma presents when conducting diplomatic and military relations with Somaliland directly, rather than through the Federal Government of Somalia and the SNA (Somali National Army).”
Still, he acknowledged the strategic value of Berbera, particularly as Washington reassesses global basing options.
“Additional access to the port of Berbera, located in Somaliland, provides redundancy (backup) and a relationally different partner. Frankly, the U.S. military, along with some of our allies and partners, need port access in Berbera,” he said.
On Capitol Hill, the debate is becoming more direct. Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, who chairs the Senate Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, has called for formal recognition of Somaliland.
He stated that “Somaliland promises to be a critical counterterrorism ally for the United States, both because of its strong willingness to partner with us and because of its unique location. We should recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state and, in the meantime, significantly boost our counterterrorism cooperation.”
Meanwhile, U.S. military engagement in the region appears to be ongoing but unofficial in nature. AFRICOM Commander Gen. Dagvin Anderson visited Somaliland in November to tour port facilities, and local officials say American delegations continue to make periodic visits focused on maritime security and counterterrorism coordination.
As Fitton-Brown summarized, “The U.S. is already using it (Somaliland) for counterterrorism operations. My understanding is that the U.S. doesn’t have a permanent military presence in Somaliland, but actively cooperates with Somaliland’s security forces on regional counterterrorism and maritime security issues.”
A Pentagon spokesperson, however, reaffirmed Washington’s official position, stating: “The United States maintains its strategic partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia.”
Still, supporters of deeper engagement argue Somaliland offers something strategically rare in a region defined by instability: a cooperative, geographically pivotal partner outside the traditional power structures—one that could reshape how the U.S. approaches the Red Sea security equation moving forward.
