According to The Wall Street Journal, the new assessments have raised concerns in Washington at a particularly difficult moment for the United States.
Years of supplying weapons to Ukraine, combined with other American military commitments, have reportedly reduced inventories of certain munitions that would be crucial during a major confrontation with Russia or China.
“The assessments, described by U.S. officials, come amid a shortfall in certain critical munitions that the military would need to confront Russia or China in a potential future war.
“The U.S. has severely degraded its stockpile of these weapons because of transfers to Ukraine after Russia’s invasion, as well as the U.S. conflict with Iran.”
President Donald Trump has pushed back against claims that America’s arsenal has been dangerously depleted.
Trump has also threatened action against Pentagon officials responsible for leaking sensitive information about U.S. weapons inventories.
But the larger concern raised by the intelligence assessment goes beyond ammunition.
A carefully calibrated Russian operation could potentially force NATO members to decide just how far they are willing to go to defend one another.
Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, an armed attack against one NATO member is considered an attack against them all.
That principle has served as the backbone of the alliance’s deterrence strategy for decades.
Putin, however, could attempt to exploit uncertainty over how that commitment would operate during a deliberately ambiguous or limited confrontation.
“The question mark is how the United States would respond in that case,” Heather Conley, a senior fellow with the American Enterprise Institute, told the Journal.
Rather than invading a NATO country with hundreds of thousands of soldiers, Moscow could potentially pursue an operation small enough to create disagreement among alliance members over whether an overwhelming military response is justified.
That could leave NATO facing an extraordinarily dangerous choice: escalate against a nuclear-armed Russia or risk demonstrating that its collective-defense pledge has limits.
Conley suggested that undermining the alliance’s credibility has long served Moscow’s strategic objectives.
“It has always been a goal to challenge the credibility of NATO and to separate the United States from its allies,” Conley said.
Until recently, U.S. intelligence assessments reportedly operated under the assumption that Putin was unlikely to risk opening another military front while Russian forces remained consumed by the war in Ukraine.
That assumption may no longer be considered safe.
Officials reportedly believe Moscow could decide that a smaller operation against NATO carries manageable risks, particularly if Putin concludes that Western governments are politically divided or reluctant to escalate.
The objective might not even be capturing and holding substantial territory.
A limited strike could instead be designed to expose divisions among NATO governments and determine whether Washington and European capitals are truly prepared to honor their defense commitments when confronted with the possibility of direct war with Russia.
The warning also arrives as Trump continues pressing European governments to shoulder more responsibility for their own security.
For years, Trump has criticized NATO countries that failed to devote sufficient resources to defense while relying heavily on American military protection.
The possibility of another Russian confrontation could make that debate far more urgent.
Europe has significantly increased military spending since Russia invaded Ukraine, but the continent still depends heavily on the United States for important military capabilities.
Meanwhile, Washington must prepare simultaneously for potential crises involving Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and other adversaries.
That makes weapons inventories—and America’s ability to rapidly replenish them—an increasingly important national security issue.
If Moscow believes the United States is overstretched, Putin could calculate that the coming months offer an opportunity to determine exactly where NATO’s red lines stand.
Such a gamble would carry enormous risks for Russia as well.
Any unmistakable attack on NATO territory could provoke a devastating response from an alliance possessing vastly greater combined economic and military resources.
But the danger described in the new assessment is precisely that Moscow may seek something short of an unmistakable, large-scale invasion.
Putin would not necessarily need to defeat NATO militarily to score a strategic victory.
If a limited Russian attack produced hesitation, political infighting or disagreement over retaliation, Moscow could claim it had exposed a weakness at the heart of the alliance.
That puts renewed pressure on European governments to demonstrate that NATO’s deterrence strategy is backed by military capability rather than promises alone.
The next several months could therefore become a major test—not merely of Putin’s willingness to gamble, but of whether Europe is prepared to defend NATO territory without assuming American taxpayers, weapons and troops will always carry the overwhelming share of the burden.
