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At the heart of Dugan’s defense was a familiar claim: that her actions were part of her responsibilities as a judge overseeing courtroom proceedings. This argument had already been raised—and rejected—before the trial even began. Still, her attorneys pressed forward, insisting that managing the flow of cases and protecting individuals in her courtroom fell squarely within her authority.
Judge Adelman was not persuaded. In a detailed 39-page opinion, he dismissed the notion that a judge is shielded from prosecution simply because the conduct in question occurred in a courtroom setting. “As I noted in denying the motion to dismiss, there was no basis for granting immunity simply because the indictment described conduct that could be considered ‘part of a judge’s job,’” Adelman wrote.
Dugan’s team also warned that allowing the conviction to stand could open the door to aggressive prosecutions, arguing that even minor interference with ICE could now be treated as a felony. But Adelman pushed back, emphasizing that intent matters when determining whether otherwise lawful actions cross the line into criminal conduct.
“Defendant takes issue with the concept that a corrupt motive can make lawful acts unlawful … it would be improper to hold [the law] cannot be applied to the conduct at issue here just because difficult line drawing issue may arise in other cases,” Adelman wrote.
The court’s ruling outlined a detailed sequence of events from April 18, 2025, when Dugan became aware that ICE agents were waiting outside her courtroom to apprehend Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, an individual scheduled to appear before her. What happened next would become the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case.
According to evidence presented at trial, Dugan enlisted fellow Judge Kristela Cervera to confront the federal agents. She then directed that the officers be taken to the office of Chief Judge Carl Ashley to review an administrative warrant—effectively diverting them from their intended objective.
Meanwhile, courtroom audio recordings revealed that Dugan called Flores-Ruiz’s case, quickly postponed it, and instructed him and his attorney to exit through a jury door leading to a private hallway. From there, they eventually made their way into a public corridor—where ICE officers were still present.
Dugan has consistently denied that she intended to help Flores-Ruiz evade arrest. She argued that she had not reviewed the warrant and was unaware of the individual’s identity at the time. During deliberations, jurors even sought clarification on whether knowing the person’s name was necessary to establish obstruction. Adelman told them it was not—a point the defense later contested.
To illustrate his reasoning, Adelman offered a comparison: “By way of analogy, in felony possession prosecutions the government typically identifies the firearm by make, model and serial number,” Adelman wrote. “But no one would argue the government is therefore required to prove the defendant knew the gun’s serial number.”
The defense also attempted to argue that Flores-Ruiz was shielded from civil arrest while attending court proceedings, suggesting that Dugan was acting to uphold those protections. But once again, the judge rejected the claim, stating that she failed to demonstrate any legitimate authority to assert such a privilege in this situation.
Ultimately, the court made clear that invoking judicial authority does not provide blanket immunity from criminal law. Adelman concluded that Dugan could not sidestep responsibility by claiming she was acting on behalf of the court system.
Perhaps most damaging to her defense were her own words in the aftermath of the incident. Audio recordings captured Dugan telling her clerk, “I’ll do it. I’ll take the heat.” In another moment, she admitted to Judge Cervera that she was “in the doghouse” with the chief judge because she “tried to help that guy.”
Those statements, combined with the sequence of events, appear to have sealed her fate—leaving the conviction intact and sending a strong message about the limits of judicial discretion in the face of federal law enforcement.
